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Headnote |
Summary of decision
The applicant was injured when the shed wall he was resting against was kicked by a colleague as a practical joke. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeal Panel were entitled to find that there was evidence of carelessness, but not of recklessness or a deliberate assault or battery. They were therefore entitled to disallow compensation on the basis that the injuries were not directly attributable to a crime of violence.
Facts
The Applicant (‘C’) was a labourer who, during a break, was resting with his back against the inside wall of a corrugated iron shed. A passing colleague (‘S’) kicked the outside of the shed, apparently as a practical joke, causing C serious spinal injuries. At an oral hearing before the Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel (‘the Panel’), findings were made that S may have been careless but was not reckless in his conduct and that there was no evidence of a deliberate assault or battery. C’s application for compensation was disallowed on the basis that the injuries were not directly attributable to a crime of violence. C sought permission to judicially review the Panel’s decision on the grounds that (i) the Panel were wrong in deciding there was no evidence of a deliberate assault or battery or of recklessness by S because there was such evidence; (ii) the Panel were wrong in their distinction between carelessness and recklessness; (ii) the Panel failed to give adequate reasons.
Held, dismissing the application for permission
(1) When the Panel stated that there was no evidence of a deliberate assault or battery or of recklessness by S, they were stating as a matter of conclusion that they were not satisfied that either of those inferences could properly be drawn from the primary facts. It was open to the Panel on the evidence they had to reach the conclusion they did.
(2) The fact that the Panel considered carelessness and reached the conclusion that there may have been carelessness illustrated the care with which they must have considered all the evidence in order to decide what inference to draw. Their observation was an indication of the careful thought process they applied rather than an indication that they erred.
(3) There was no requirement in law that the Panel should set out their reasons as a fact-finding tribunal in the way in which judges customarily set out the evidence. The evidence the Panel had in this case was not in issue. There was no basis for suggesting that the reasons given were inadequate.
Cases referred to in judgment
R v Legal Aid Area (No.8) ex parte Parkinson [1990] The Times LR 201
Mr Andrew Hogan instructed by Tracey Barlow & Furniss for the Applicant
Mr Clive Sheldon instructed by the Treasury Solicitor for the Respondent
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