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Headnote |
Summary of decision
The Court refused to interfere with the decisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board to refuse awards of compensation to two victims of violent assaults on the grounds of their criminal convictions.
Facts
Two men (‘T’) and (‘C’) were, on separate occasions, victims of unprovoked crimes of violence and sustained injuries as a result. T was stabbed and C suffered a fracture of his right leg. Both men’s applications for compensation were rejected by the Board pursuant to paragraph 6(c) of the 1979 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (‘the 1979 Scheme’) as a consequence of their previous convictions.
T’s list of convictions was long and included crimes of dishonesty and violence however he had not been in any trouble since his last offence two years earlier. In reaching their conclusions in respect of T it was stated that the Board had given full weight to his reformed character during the previous two years however given the record of his convictions the application was rejected. The Board stated that if T were to be assaulted in the future but in the meantime he maintained his reformed character they might take another view but that at this stage it was too soon after the last conviction to make an award.
Similarly, C had a large number of previous convictions, including many for which he had received terms of imprisonment. The Board in C’s case considered that “having regard to the applicant’s character and way of life as disclosed by his convictions, it was not appropriate that he should receive any award at all from public funds”.
Both T and C applied for judicial review. Their applications were refused by Stephen Brown J in the High Court on the grounds that the Scheme, as published, was intended to afford the widest possible discretion to the Board and that the second part of paragraph 6(c) gave the Board discretion to withhold or reduce compensation, both having regard to the conduct of the applicant and, furthermore, having regard to his character and way of life. He held that this latter consideration was not limited to matters relevant in some way to the particular incident and that the decisions arrived at were wholly and properly within the discretion of the Board.
T and C appealed again on the grounds that the Board had misdirected itself in the construction which it had apparently placed upon paragraph 6(c) of the 1979 Scheme. In their submissions, compensation should not be withheld or reduced unless the applicant’s conduct, character or way of life had some ascertainable bearing on the occurrence of the injury or its aftermath.
Held, dismissing the appeals,
(1) The 1979 Scheme was discretionary and the discretion was that of the Board. It followed that the Board’s decisions could only be reviewed if it misconstrued its mandate or, on Wednesbury principles, must be deemed to have done so since its decision was one which no reasonable body could have reached on the facts if it had correctly construed its mandate.
(2) There were two broad categories in paragraph 6(c):-
(a) “the conduct of the applicant before, during or after the events giving rise to the claim”. In such cases the conduct would usually have some ascertainable bearing on the occurrence of the injury or its aftermath, although, the court did not want to be taken as deciding that it must do so.
(b) the character and way of life of the applicant, where it was much less likely that this had any ascertainable bearing on the occurrence of the injury but again may be such that the applicant would not be thought to be an appropriate recipient of public bounty.
(3) In each case, although different categories of circumstances could be taken into account, the issue was the same, namely whether the applicant was an appropriate recipient of an ex gratia compensatory payment made at the public expense. As with all discretionary decisions, there would be cases where the answer was clear one way or the other and cases which were on the borderline and in which different people might reach different decisions. The Crown had left these decisions to the Board and the Court could and should only intervene if the Board has misconstrued its mandate or its decision was plainly wrong. Neither could be said about the decisions of the Board in the present appeals.
Parts of scheme and other legislation referred to in judgment
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1979, paragraph 6(c)
Road Traffic Act 1972, section 25
Cases referred to in judgment
R v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain (1967) 2 Q.B. 864 ;
R v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Ince [1973] 1 WLR 1334
Mr. Stephen Sedley, QC (instructed by Messrs. Sharpe Pritchard & Co., London agents for Messrs. Casson & Co. of' Salford) appeared on behalf of the appellant Thompstone.
Mr. R.S. Smith (instructed by Messrs. Sidney Torrance, London, agents for Messrs. Barrington Black Austin & Co. of Leeds) appeared on behalf of the appellant Crowe.
Mr John Crowley, QC and Mr. John Laws (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
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