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Headnote |
Summary of decision
The applicant was seriously injured when a man knocking at his door shot him with a sawn-off shotgun. The Board disallowed his application for compensation on the basis that he had failed to disclose all he knew about the matter. In reaching their decision, the Board erroneously stated that the burden of proof was on the applicant in relation to paragraph 17 of the Scheme. However, the Board’s decision would have been the same even if they had correctly directed themselves. The Court therefore did not interfere with their decision.
Facts
The applicant (‘P’) was seriously injured when a man knocked at his door pretending to deliver a letter and then shot him with a sawn-off shotgun. P’s application for compensation was rejected by a single member of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ('The Board') on the basis (a) of his previous character (paragraph 17 of the Scheme) and (b) because he had failed to disclose all he knew about the matter. Soon after the shooting he had said to police 'It's the Binstock mob', but would not or could not give any further particulars. He subsequently maintained that he said this because of some newspaper articles he had read about this mob. At a hearing before a full Board, evidence was heard from P and from the Chief Inspector of Police, who was of the view that there had been no concealment by P. P’s application was disallowed on the basis of a failure make full disclosure regarding the events complained of. The Board considered that the shooting had the hall marks of a professional 'hit job' raising the inference that the Applicant was acquainted with his assailant. The Board stated in their decision that following R v CICB ex parte Lloyd (unreported, 4 July 1980), the burden of proof was on P in relation to the matters arising under paragraph 17 of the Scheme (conduct and character). P sought judicial review of the Board’s decision on the grounds that (a) the Board misdirected themselves as to the burden of proof and (b) there was no proper material on which they could come to the decision they did.
Held, dismissing the application
(1) R v CICB ex parte Lloyd makes it clear that whilst the onus is on the applicant to show he comes within the Scheme (ie within paragraph 5), the burden is not on the applicant to show that paragraph 17 does not apply to the case. However, if the evidence put before the Board shows a prima facie case on circumstances which would make paragraph 17 applicable, then there is an onus on the applicant to show on the balance of probabilities that those facts are not such as to bring paragraph 17 into operation.
(2) The Board must be entitled, if there is material before them which justifies doing so, to come to a conclusion which is different from that of a witness, even if the witness is as responsible as a Chief Inspector. It cannot be said that there was no material to justify this decision by the Board (R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex parte Moore (1965) 1 QB 456 followed). The Board was quite entitled to reject as untruthful, the evidence of the Applicant.
(3) Once the Board came to a specific conclusion, namely that P knew who was responsible at the outset, the legal burden of proof in relation to the application of paragraph 17 is really not important. The Board’s decision would be exactly the same applying strictly what was said in Lloyd about the legal onus of proof and the evidential burden of proof.
Parts of scheme and other legislation referred to in judgment
1979 Scheme, paragraphs 5, 17 & 22
Cases referred to in judgment
R v CICB ex parte Lloyd (Unreported, 4 July 1980)
R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex parte Moore (1965) 1 QB 456
Representation
Mr P Sheridan QC and Mr P Ralls instructed by Messrs Lickfolds Wiles & Powles for the Applicant
Mr S Brown instructed by the Treasury Solicitor for the Respondent
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