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Headnote |
Summary of decision
When a police officer was injured during a car chase, there was material in the evidence before the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board which had enabled them to reach the conclusion that the injury was sustained accidentally and that the officer was not taking an exceptional risk. It would be impossible to conclude that the conclusions reached by the Board were perverse or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.
Facts
The applicant, E, a police officer, was driving a police vehicle in pursuit of a suspected offender. During the chase the offender’s vehicle braked suddenly causing E to come to a halt in the middle of a road junction. The offender then drove off. As E began to move forwards her car was struck on the right hand side by a third vehicle entering the junction. There was a violent impact and E was injured. E argued before the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (“the Board”) that the offender had stopped on the junction deliberately so as to endanger her or had acted recklessly as to whether she might be injured. The Board were not satisfied that the actions of the offender were either deliberate or reckless as, in their view, the offender had insufficient time to formulate the course of action which E sought to assign to him. Accordingly the Board were not satisfied that E’s application fell within the ambit of paragraph 4(a) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1969 (“the 1969 Scheme”) as E was unable to demonstrate that her injury was attributable to a crime of violence.
E sought judicial review of the Board’s decision. She submitted that:-
(a) that the actions of the offender constituted an assault because they amounted to a deliberate attempt to injure or frighten; and
(b) the decision of the Board was perverse and unreasonable in failing to hold that the circumstances in which the injuries were sustained, if accidental, gave rise to an exceptional risk.
Held, refusing the application
(1) The difficulty with E’s first submission was that the Board, having heard evidence from the police officers and having considered the statements in the police reports of the accident, were not satisfied that in braking as he did the offender did so either deliberately so as to endanger E or recklessly. In other words, they were not satisfied that the driver was aiming his behaviour at the following police officer. There was no basis upon which it could be said that this conclusion on the evidence before the Board was unreasonable or perverse in the Wednesbury sense.
(2) In considering whether the circumstances at the time when the injuries were sustained gave rise to an exceptional risk, the words “at the time” did involve taking into account not precisely what was happening when the injuries were sustained but the context in which those injuries were sustained which might, according to the circumstances of the particular case, involve looking at matters which occurred some little time before.
(3) The insuperable difficulty for E, on the facts of the present case, was that it is clear from the decision of the Board that they did view what had happened at the crossroads in the context of that which had happened before. There was however, in the evidence before the Board, material which would enable them to reach the conclusion that there was no exceptional risk. It would be impossible to conclude that the conclusions reached by the Board were perverse or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.
Parts of scheme and other legislation referred to in judgment
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1979, paragraphs 4(b), 6(d)
Representation
Mr F Burton (instructed by Messrs Russell Jones & Walker) for A
Mr G Sankey (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) for the respondent
Summary of decision
When a police officer was injured during a car chase, there was material in the evidence before the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board which had enabled them to reach the conclusion that the injury was sustained accidentally and that the officer was not taking an exceptional risk. It would be impossible to conclude that the conclusions reached by the Board were perverse or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.
Facts
The applicant, E, a police officer, was driving a police vehicle in pursuit of a suspected offender. During the chase the offender’s vehicle braked suddenly causing E to come to a halt in the middle of a road junction. The offender then drove off. As E began to move forwards her car was struck on the right hand side by a third vehicle entering the junction. There was a violent impact and E was injured. E argued before the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (“the Board”) that the offender had stopped on the junction deliberately so as to endanger her or had acted recklessly as to whether she might be injured. The Board were not satisfied that the actions of the offender were either deliberate or reckless as, in their view, the offender had insufficient time to formulate the course of action which E sought to assign to him. Accordingly the Board were not satisfied that E’s application fell within the ambit of paragraph 4(a) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1969 (“the 1969 Scheme”) as E was unable to demonstrate that her injury was attributable to a crime of violence.
E sought judicial review of the Board’s decision. She submitted that:-
(a) that the actions of the offender constituted an assault because they amounted to a deliberate attempt to injure or frighten; and
(b) the decision of the Board was perverse and unreasonable in failing to hold that the circumstances in which the injuries were sustained, if accidental, gave rise to an exceptional risk.
Held, refusing the application
(1) The difficulty with E’s first submission was that the Board, having heard evidence from the police officers and having considered the statements in the police reports of the accident, were not satisfied that in braking as he did the offender did so either deliberately so as to endanger E or recklessly. In other words, they were not satisfied that the driver was aiming his behaviour at the following police officer. There was no basis upon which it could be said that this conclusion on the evidence before the Board was unreasonable or perverse in the Wednesbury sense.
(2) In considering whether the circumstances at the time when the injuries were sustained gave rise to an exceptional risk, the words “at the time” did involve taking into account not precisely what was happening when the injuries were sustained but the context in which those injuries were sustained which might, according to the circumstances of the particular case, involve looking at matters which occurred some little time before.
(3) The insuperable difficulty for E, on the facts of the present case, was that it is clear from the decision of the Board that they did view what had happened at the crossroads in the context of that which had happened before. There was however, in the evidence before the Board, material which would enable them to reach the conclusion that there was no exceptional risk. It would be impossible to conclude that the conclusions reached by the Board were perverse or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.
Parts of scheme and other legislation referred to in judgment
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1979, paragraphs 4(b), 6(d)
Representation
Mr F Burton (instructed by Messrs Russell Jones & Walker) for A
Mr G Sankey (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) for the respondent
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