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Headnote |
Summary of decision
In a claim for sexual abuse under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1969 where the then child Applicant was living together with her abuser – her father, the Board had no jurisdiction to grant compensation. A subsequent application for compensation for sexual abuse by her grandfather with whom she had not been living at the time of the abuse, also failed because the claim was made outwith the 3 year time limit and the grandfather had not been prosecuted. In addition, where the Applicant had failed to bring judicial review proceedings within the 3 month time limit and there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay between December 1993 and May 1994, no extension of time would be granted pursuant to Order 53 Rule 4.
Facts
The Applicant (‘D’), born in 1958, was the victim of abuse by her father between the ages of 7 and 14. She had felt unable to report the abuse until 1989, when she was 30 years of age. Convictions resulted in 1990. D then sought compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1969 (‘the Scheme’). In 1990, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (‘the Board’) refused D’s claim on the basis that she was living together with her assailant at the time of the injury and that the claim was outside the three year time limit. In 1992, D applied for compensation in respect of alleged sexual abuse by her grandfather. After criminal investigation in August 1994, it was decided that he would not be prosecuted. The age and poor health of the grandfather were factors in the decision, along with the delay in making the allegations. The Board refused D’s second application as being outside the requisite 3 year limit. D applied for judicial review of the second application, arguing that the Chairman’s decision was irrational or Wednesbury unreasonable or that there had been a misdirection. That decision had been made in December 1992, the Chairman’s response to the Applicant’s challenge to the Board’s decision had been made known in March 1993 and Legal Aid had been available to the Applicant from August 1993. However, judicial review proceedings were not issued until May 1994.
Held, dismissing the application
(1) There was nothing to suggest that the Chairman of the Board did not take into account all the relevant facts of the case and, in particular, those raised by D. The Chairman was aware of the difficulties in investigating old claims, the problem of evidence for a fair decision. There was no irrationality, unreasonableness or misdirection.
(2) Per Judge J (Obiter) “In cases where sexual abuse has been established before a court…it would not in my judgment normally be reasonable for excessive attention to be paid to the delay which may have elapsed before the victim was able to bring herself to report the crimes. It would equally not normally be reasonable for the Board to take account of further delay occasioned by the workings of the ordinary criminal process.”
(3) Even if there had been merit in the application for judicial review, there was on the facts of this case, no good reason for time to be extended pursuant to Order 53 Rule 4.
Parts of the scheme and other legislation referred to in judgment
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1969, paragraph 4
Supreme Court Act 1981 section 31
RSC Order 53, rule 4
Cases referred to in the judgment
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223; [1947] 2 All E.R. 680, C.A.
R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte D, 22 February 1995, Schiemann J, unreported.
Caswell v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales [1990] 2 AC 738
R v Stratford-on-Avon District Council, ex parte Jackson [1985] 1 WLR 1319
Representation
Mr David Fletcher, instructed by Messrs Bazeley Barnes & Bazeley, Bideford, for D.
Miss Dinah Rose, instructed by the Treasury Solicitor, for the Board.
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